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I. Introduction
The purpose of this article is to examine some features of the
International Criminal Court (hereinafter "ICC") procedural
system, in particular the law of evidence, making use of theoretical
models. The article first deals with the disclosure phase. Second,
it focuses on the admission of evidence. To conduct the analysis,
two widely known theoretical models, are employed: the
accusatorial versus the inquisitorial model, and the Damaika
partition between the reactive and proactive State. Despite its
accusatorial structure, ICC provisions provide many important
exceptions to the typical features of the accusatorial theoretical
model. In particular, to uphold the values inherent in the
international criminal justice system, the ICC Statute and Rules
provide various exceptions to the prohibition against admitting
unchallenged testimonial statements at trial. Additionally, in the
disclosure phase, notwithstanding a parties-led general structure,
procedural sanctions seem oriented towards leading the trial to a
(possibly correct) conclusion on the merits, rather than merely
punishing the misconduct of a culpable party.
The above exceptions make the system, considered as a whole,
partially ineffective. The emerging picture is that the accusatorial
structure of the processes in international criminal procedures was
adopted by the drafters without effectively implementing all its
specific technical consequences. The frequent exceptions to the
technical solutions implied by this theoretical model put the
fairness of the system in constant tension. This tension is
reminiscent of two historical precedents: the 1808 Napol6on
counter-reform and the Italian struggle for an accusatorial system.
The price of the inconsistencies in the accusatorial structure, in
most cases, seems to be paid by the defense, which is
systematically disadvantaged. Some changes in the interpretation
and application of the ICC sources concerning the law of evidence
would be advisable in order to rectify certain inconsistencies.
Among them is a proposal for greater observation of the orality
principle. To make this sustainable, it would be advisable to
develop and improve the hermeneutic solution (originally
conceived by the Ad Hoc Tribunals' jurisprudence), which is
based on the partition between acts and conduct of the defendant,
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and other contextual aspects of the indictment.
II. Reasons to Examine a Procedural System that Uses
Theoretical Models
The aim of this work is mainly theoretical. Its purpose is to
examine some features of the ICC procedural system-in
particular the law of evidence-making use of theoretical models.
For some, this approach is considered a mistake in itself. It is not
uncommon at the international level to assert that procedure is
almost exclusively a practical matter, that what matters is the
description of what happens in every single case, and not the
consideration of the theoretical nature of the system. While a
completely theoretical nature simply does not exist, specific
criminal proceedings deserve to be reported and studied carefully.
In the international criminal scenario, procedural systems were
shaped in such a way to reflect different legal traditions.
Particularly, but not exclusively, at the ICC, the drafters
specifically sought not to reproduce local or national models.2
Thus, some maintain that it is a mistake to analyze the ICC
procedure in the light of theoretical models that were elaborated in
State traditions,3 as this interpretative operation would lead to the
result the drafters wanted to prevent: the implementation of
passively national legal models.4
This kind of approach is highly controversial, even incorrect.
In particular, the erroneousness of this approach-that we can
define an approach merely focusing on the practice-is obvious if
we look at the implied consequences. First, without making use of
theoretical models, it is impossible to answer some of the most
intricate questions, such as whether the system as a whole is
consistent with its core values or with the goals it is meant to
I See Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due
Process Aspirations and Limitations, THE BERKELEY ELECTRONIC PRESS, 62 (2006);
Claus Kress, The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in Outline:
Anatomy ofa Unique Compromise, 1 JOURNAL OF INT. CRIM. JUST. 602, 604-605 (2003).
2 See Kress, supra note 1, at 604-605.
3 Id. See also K. Ambos, International Criminal Procedure: "Adversarial",
"Inquisitorial" or Mixed?, 3 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 1, 2-5 (2003); M. Findlay, Synthesis in
Trial Procedures? The Experience of International Criminal Tribunals, in 50 INT. AND
CoMP. LAW QUART. 38, 40-41 (2001).
4 See Kress, supra note 1, at 605.
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achieve.' Secondly, a purely practical approach can separate
fairness from consistency. The system is fair in name only, as its
fairness is not scrutinized using theoretical models. In other
words, fairness ends up being based on the intentions of the
drafters (and of those called to handle the procedure) more than
the consistency of the outcome with the founding values of the
system. This consequence is difficult to accept because it is
contradictory to the method usually adopted to test the fairness of
a system. As Damaika teaches, the primary concern in any
procedural mechanism is whether the outcome is predictable,
consistent, and coherent with its founding values and its sources,
as justice itself is almost impossible to define.6 For all these
reasons, without the help of theoretical models, any kind of
process, despite the good intentions of its founders, is in constant
danger of becoming unfair.
Theoretical models are fundamental in many aspects. First,
they provide for the system's consistency and predictability of the
system, representing the most important component of what we
call, in one simple word, justice. Most of all, theoretical models
are extremely helpful in deciding what Ronald Dworkin defined as
"hard cases," 7 cases that cannot be solved by making use of
judicial precedents or applying provisions of the law. This is
because these "hard cases" are ambiguous on the point. When no
answer can be found in the ordinary sources, theoretical models
play a decisive role. Theoretical models help us define our
philosophical priorities, especially in crises when we are not able
to find an answer to a problematic case.
Of course, theoretical models are not historical models. It is a
5 Actually, there are some very interesting attempts to apply theoretical models to
the International Criminal Justice. See, e.g., Bert Swart, Damaika and the Faces of
International Criminal Justice, 6 J. INT. CRIM. JUST. 82, 89-92 (2008); Maximo Langer,
The Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 834,
835 (2005); Megan Fairlie, The Marriage of Common and Continental Law at the ICTY
and its Progeny, Due Process Deficit, 4 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 242, 243 (2004).
6 See Mirjan R. Damaika, The Henry Morris Lecture: What Is The Point of
International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 330, at 331-335 (2008). Of the
same author, see Problematic Features ofInternational Criminal Procedure, in ANTONIo
CASSESE (ed.), THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Oxford
Un. Press: Oxford, 2009), at 175-86.
7 RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1978).
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mistake to confuse the two. Theoretical models are the results of
abstraction,' and while they do not exist in the real world, any
existing system is not pure if considered under the lens of
theoretical models. Reality shows us only melted models, in
which the method of blending the theoretical ingredients makes
the difference. However, any living system should be studied with
a theoretical approach (even if combined with other approaches),
in order to understand and ascertain not only how the system
works, but also how it ought to work.
In conclusion, theoretical models provide for evaluating the
final political and ideological goals pursued by procedural systems
as well as the means to achieve those goals. For these reasons,
theoretical models are essential to test a system's dedication to
justice, as concepts of "justice" and "truth" do not have a simple,
clear definition, but are largely influenced by consistency and
predictability of a system's outcomes more than the founding
values of the system.
III. Accusatorial vs. Inquisitorial, Reactive State vs. Proactive
State
In conducting an analysis on ICC provisions, this article will
make use of two widely known theoretical partitions: the
dichotomy between accusatorial and inquisitorial, on one side (as
far as admission of evidence is concerned), and the Damaika
distinction between a coordinate officialdom/resolution of
conflicts model and a hierarchical officialdom/policies
8 As it has been said:
The traditional dichotomy alludes to two hypothetical models obtained by
making a generalization from some real features of existing or historically
existed systems. It follows that it is not a matter of how the law has to be
interpreted. The concept rather depends on the choice of an ideologically
oriented scale of values. The features of the accusatorial system are determined
only as opposed to those of the inquisitorial system and vice-versa: therefore
they represent only ideal models that in practice can combine in different ways,
in relation to several variables.
Giulio Illuminati, The Accusatorial Process from the Italian Point of View, 35 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 295, 297-298 (2010).
9 See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMA9KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS, 1440-1441 (1986) (discussing the
difficulties of distinguishing systems according to their accusatorial or inquisitorial
nature, rather than about theoretical ingredients in general).
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implementation model on the other side.'o
Because the latter will be used mainly in the analysis of the
disclosure phase, it seems relevant to first focus on the sanctions
provided for procedural violations. In a system mainly oriented
towards "litigation-solving" rather than implementing policies, the
violation of a procedural provision results in a sanction even if the
sanction would prevent the process from achieving a final result."
The need to punish procedural misconduct is more important than
the need for trial to reach its "natural" end: namely, the conviction
of the guilty and the acquittal of the innocent. 2 Playing by the
rules is a very important value, probably "the" value, while
concrete outcomes of the trial represent a secondary, though
certainly important, value. '3 In contrast, in a policies
implementation model, the most important goal is that the trial can
reach an end: in other words, that a case is not brought to trial in
vain.14 Procedural sanctions may certainly play a role, but will not
jeopardize the ability of judges to decide a case on the merits.'"
The distinction has important relevance in the law of evidence. 6
While the coordinate/conflicts resolution system will prefer the
exclusion of evidence gathered in violation of the rules (at least,
the most important and characterizing rules), the
hierarchical/policies implementation system will tend to balance
the need for a procedural sanction with the preference that a trial
can lead to a decision on the merits.17 A hierarchical approach to
trial is adverse to the risk that procedural impropriety by a party to
a case might threaten a judge's ability to adjudicate the case on the
10 MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986). For an analysis of the
Damaika distinction applied to the ICC system, see Bert Swart, Damaika and the Faces
of International Criminal Justice, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 87, 89-92, 97-114 (2008);
Michele Caianiello, Disclosure before the ICC: The Emergence of a New Form of
Policies Implementation System in International Criminal Justice?, 10 INT'L CRIM. L.
REv. 23, 24 (2010).
11 See Caianiello, supra note 10, at 25.
12 See id.
13 See id.
I4 See id.
15 See id.
16 See Caianiello, supra note 10, at 25.
17 See id. at 25-26.
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merits.
In making the distinction between accusatorial and
inquisitorial, this article will focus on the implications of the
"equality of arms" principle in the field of the law of evidence.
Equality of arms represents a specific, rigid principle of the.
accusatorial model, which is conceived and framed mainly as a
dispute between two litigants. 9 In order to make the fight fair, the
two contenders must have the same chances of winning; 20 it is
unthinkable that one side should constantly be in an advantaged
institutional position. This is not a concern of the inquisitorial
system, in which, conversely, one player is structurally in the
prominent position. Historically, the stronger party was the judge,
who acted as prosecutor; through time, the mixed procedure
stemming from the Napoleonic reform made it so that the
prosecutor is now in a stronger position with more access to the
judge than the accused.2 1 In such a system, the main concern
18 See id. at 26.
19 See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, supra note 10, at 3. "Equality of arms" is a recurring
definition in international criminal trials, and for the doctrine dealing with this subject.
However, the meanings attributed to this phrase are not always the same. Rarely indeed
do scholars use these mentioned words to refer to a similar concept. This work attributes
a particular meaning to the term "equality of arms," as will be explained. For some
alternative definitions of the concept known as "equality of arms," compare Gabrielle
McIntyre, Equality of Arms-Defining Human Rights in the Jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 16 LEIDEN JOURN. INT. LAW
267, 269 (2003); Stefania Negri, The Principle of "Equality of Arms" and the Evolving
Law of International Criminal Procedure, 5 INTL. CRIM. L. REV. 508, at 513 (2005);
Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, The Dichotomy between Judicial Economy and Equality of
Arms within International and Internationalized Criminal Trials: A Defense Perspective,
28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1565, 1567-1569 (2005). For a reconstruction of the equality of
arms principle before international criminal tribunals, see Salvatore ZappalA, The Rights
of the Accused, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY, 1328-1333 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R.W.D. Jones) (2002).
See also VLADIMIR TOCHILOVSKY, JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURTS AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 277-
285 (Martinus Nijhoff) (2008). For an analysis of the equality of arms principle as
interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, see SARAH J. SUMMERS, FAIR
TRIALS: THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL TRADITION AND THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 103-112 (2007).
20 Illuminati, supra note 8, at 314.
21 See Michele Panzavolta, Reforms and Counter-Reforms in the Italian Struggle
for an Accusatorial Criminal Law System, 30 N. C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 578, 582-83
(2005).
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regarding the fairness of the proceedings is the impartiality of the
official inquiring organ-an intrinsic quality of the person-rather
than an institutional feature.
The accusatorial way to conceive the equality of arms carries
consequences regarding the evidence administration at trial. First,
equality implies the adoption of the party presentation style to
maintain the judge's impartiality and equidistance among the
litigants.2 2 In essence, the accusatorial process consists of leaving
it up to the prosecutor and the defense to introduce the relevant
evidence and prove the facts of their cases. 23 But the most
important element derived from the accusatorial concept of
equality of arms is the exclusion of the untested evidence gathered
during the investigations from the trial.24 Equality means, that no
party can start the trial in a position of advantage over the other
party. 25 As mentioned before, both parties must enjoy the same
chance of success at trial. Therefore, to test any provision's
adherence to the equality of arms principle, it is crucial to
determine whether the parties to the proceeding are in a
substantially equal position.2 6
22 See Illuminati, supra note 8, at 311.
23 Even when the judge is given the power to call for some evidence, this is
generally to complement the parties' strategy, in a merely subsidiary way. See
Illuminati, supra note 8, at 313-15.
24 It is well known that this assertion is highly contested, and that until now neither
the European court of Human Rights nor the international criminal courts have
recognized the duty to exclude evidence obtained during the investigations phase. See
Ari S. Bassin, "Dead Men Tell No Tales": Rule 92 Bis-How The Ad Hoc International
Criminal Tribunals Unnecessarily Silence the Dead, 81 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1763, 1766
(2006); John D. Jackson, The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal Evidentiary
Processes: Towards Convergence, Divergence or Realignment?, 68 MLR 734, 737-764
(2005); Elisabeth M. Dipardo, Caught In a Web of Lies: Use of Prior Inconsistent
Statements to Impeach Witnesses before the ICTY, 31 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 275,
277-301 (2005); Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal
Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 725, 727-
765 (1999); RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMNAL EVIDENCE
209 (2002).
25 See Illuminati, supra note 8, at 313-314.
26 See Ennio Amodio, The Accusatorial System Lost and Regained: Reforming
Criminal Procedure in Italy, 52 AM. J. CoMP. L. 489, 489-500 (2004); Illuminati, supra
note 8, at 310-311; Giulio Illuminati, The Frustrated Turn to Adversarial Procedure in
Italy (Italian Criminal Procedure Code of 1988), 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.
567, 569-570 (2005); Mariangela Montagna & William T. Pizzi, The Battle to Establish
an Adversarial Trial System in Italy, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L., 429, 432-435 (2004);
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In the investigation phase, the prosecutor is always in a
predominant position due to the means at his or her disposal for
gathering information before the trial.27 To re-establish equality, it
is necessary to ban all unchallenged statements collected during
the investigations phase from being used as evidence. The
prohibition of hearsay is strictly, though not solely,28 linked to the
equality of arms principle. If it were possible for the parties to use
statements gathered before the trial as evidence without any
confrontation with the witness, de facto the prosecution and
defense would stand in unequal positions at trial. 29 The prosecutor
can draw advantage from his means of investigation, which are, in
general, much broader than those of the defense.30 For this reason,
it is not possible to define a system as accusatorial in the absence
of a rule against hearsay, even if the defense were able to conduct
its own investigations. The disproportion of investigative means
between the two counterparts-prosecution on one side and
defense on the other-would result in a systematic advantage for
the prosecutor.31 Equality, in other words, would be superficial.3 2
Some might argue that there is no cause for concern regarding
Panzavolta, supra note 21, at 582-583, 585-590; William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The
New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Dificulties of Building an Adversarial
Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (1992).
27 See Illuminati, supra note 8, at 312-314.
28 Of course, it is undeniable that the prohibition of hearsay serves many different
purposes. From a historical point of view, the rule against hearsay is linked to the jury
system. See MIRIAN R. DAMARKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 12-17 (1995). This is why its
necessity is often denied at international level, where professional judges are called to
adjudicate the case. See infra, Section 5). Moreover, the prohibition of hearsay is
connected with the problem of reliability, as far as the possibility to challenge the
credibility of the source is at stake. In other words, to verify the credibility of any
evidence, cross-examination is fundamental. It follows that items of evidence for which
cross-examination is not possible, such as out of court statements, affidavits, etc., are
inadmissible. See 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 (3d ed. 1940) (stating Wigmore's
famous definition, "Cross examination is the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth."). See also supra note 10. As is well known among criminal law
scholars, the debate on the prohibition of hearsay evidence has been particularly
exhaustive in Italy, owing to the adoption of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, which
is inspired by the accusatorial model.
29 See Illuminati, supra note 8, at 312-314.
30 See id.
31 See id.
32 See id., at 310-11.
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the disproportion of investigative means at the international level,
where the defense can often carry out its own investigations
efficiently.33  This is not a well-founded opinion. In fact, due to
the Rome Statute provisions, the prosecutor is given a structural
advantage over the defendant during the investigations phase. The
prosecutor is an official organ of the Court, appointed in a way
similar to a judge, with express power to seek the cooperation and
compliance of any state or intergovernmental organization and to
enter into agreements with them.34 The prosecutor, moreover, may
officially be informed on matters concerning compliance with
requests for cooperation issued by the Court, under Article 93
provisions (specifically dealing with the collection of evidence).
Furthermore, during investigations, the prosecutor has discretion
to select the cases to prosecute on the basis of the evidence
collected.3 ' Finally, in practice, the policy of "self-referrals" by
the State Parties, formulated by the Office of the Prosecutor,
33 See id.
34 See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf 183/10, art. 54 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
3 Id. art. 93.
36 According to Article 53 of the Rome Statute, there are various parameters that
the Prosecutor must take into consideration when deciding to start an investigation or to
file an indictment: the gravity of the case, the interests of victims, the admissibility of the
case according to Article 17, and the interests of justice. Among those parameters,
Article 53 2 provides for the "sufficient legal or factual basis to seek a warrant or
summons under Article 58." Id. art. 53. This criterion is nothing more than an evidence
test. In fact, Article 58 T 1 recalled by Article 53, defines as sufficient legal or factual
basis to seek a warrant or a summons when "[t]here are reasonable grounds to believe
that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court." Id. art. 58.
37 At the time of writing, the Office of the Prosecutor is dealing with the following
situations: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC-01/04); the Central African
Republic (ICC-01/05-01/08); Uganda (ICC-02/04); Darfur, Sudan (ICC-02/05); and,
since March 31st, 2010, Kenya. With the exception of Darfur and Kenya, the other
situations were taken into consideration by the OTP as a consequence of a referral by the
State parties or, more properly, by the State in whose territory the events for which the
Prosecutor decided to start the investigation took place. In practice, all but Darfur were
cases of so called self-referrals (while Darfur was started after UN Security Council
referral, and Kenya proprio motu by the Prosecutor, pursuant to Article 15 of the
Statute). See Claus Kress, Self Referrals and Waivers of Complementarity, Some
Considerations in Law and in Policy, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 944, 944-948 (2004); see
also, Mahnoush. H. Arsajani & W. Michael Reisman, The Law-in-Action of
International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 385 (2005); William. A. Schabas,
Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 J.
296
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makes it reasonable to assume that State parties are more keen to
cooperate with the Prosecutor than with the defense on concrete
cases at stake before the ICC," without regard to whether the
Office of the Prosecutor conducts its work with an impartial and
fair approach.3 9
In order to achieve consistency and coherence, it is necessary
that once the accusatorial framework has been chosen, testimonial
statements collected ex parte out of court should be banned as
evidence at trial (or, at most, should only be admitted in very
limited circumstances). Of course, the opposite is true if the
inquisitorial model is selected. In this case, as stated before, the
system relies mostly on the impartiality of the chief actors in
INT'L CRIM. JUST 731 (2008); William. A. Schabas, 'Complementarity in Practice': Some
Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 19 CRIM. L. F. 5, 5-33 (2008); Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The
Gravity Threshold under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 19 CRIM. L. F.
35, 35-37 (2008); William W. Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice: The
International Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-level Global Governance in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L. L. 557, 557-90 (2005); William
W. Burke-White, Implementing a Policy of Positive Complementarity in the Rome
System of Justice, 19 CRIM. L. F. 59, 59-85 (2008); William W. Burke-White & Scott
Kaplan, Domestic Justice: The International Criminal Court and an Admissibility
Challenge in the Uganda Situation, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST 257, 257-79 (2009); Carsten
Stahn, Complementarity: A Tale of Two Notions, 19 CRIM. L. F. 87, 87-113 (2008);
Jakob Pichon, The Principle of Complementarity in the Cases of the Sudanese Nationals
Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb before the International Criminal Court, 8 INT'L CRIM.
L. REv. 185, 185-228 (2008).
38 As William Schabas observes in one case:
The Prosecutor was content, because the arrest warrant was issued, and he could
now provide tangible evidence that he was doing his job. The judges were
delighted to have a real trial, after years of relative inactivity. The State Party
was satisfied to have disposed of a troublesome rebel leader who would be
judged in distant Europe. And the accused, who might normally be expected to
challenge irregular application of the law in a prosecution, was thrilled that he
would remain in The Hague and not be sent back home, where he was facing
charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. It was a 'win-win' situation
for all concerned.
William Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
757, 760 (2008).
39 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT. A
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 676 (2010) ("The complex litigation concerning
disclosure to the defence and the obtaining of evidence under confidentiality agreement .
. . suggests that, despite the herms of article 54 (1)(a), the Office of the Prosecutor in its
early years may not have approached the gathering of evidence in an entirely even-
handed manner.").
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trying the case: the judges.4 0 In such a context, no rule against
hearsay is necessary, even though in an historical perspective,
various inquisitorial models adopted provisions ordering the judge
to consider summa cum prudentia unchallenged written
statements.4 1 Perhaps, the worst hypothesis for the fairness of the
system occurs when, despite the accusatorial structure, hearsay
evidence is broadly admitted. In such cases, the process combines
the worst aspects of the two models. On one side, it is polarized in
the accusatorial way, and therefore both the collection and
presentation of evidence rely primarily on the parties.4 2 On the
other, it is structurally unequal because the prosecutor is
systematically in a better position than the defense.4 3
IV. ICC Disclosure of Evidence: A Parties-Based Activity
(Without Severe Sanctions)
A closer view of the ICC disclosure system reveals various
provisions depicting a party based activity." There is no official
investigation file.45 The prosecutor and the defense must select the
evidence they consider relevant for their respective cases.46 This is
true for the confirmation hearing preceding the trial, governed by
Article 61 of the ICC Statute, as well as for the trial itself.4 7 At
both stages, it is up to the parties to select the materials to present
to the judge, and to disclose those materials to their counterpart.4 8
40 See Illuminati, supra note 8.
41 See Mirian Damaika, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 MINN. L. REV. 425, 436-
439 (1992).
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 See Caianiello, supra note 10.
45 See id.
46 See Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 54.
47 The judges have some powers to interfere with disclosure options adopted by the
parties. The most important powers are, on one side, the control over the Prosecutor's
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant, and on the other, the power to
call for new evidence. Regarding the latter, the interferences are of indirect nature, but
effective nonetheless. Once disposed of proprio motu, for the admission of additional
evidence, the parties must exchange the relevant information (such as, for example,
previous testimonial statements). See Caianiello, supra note 10, at 27; see also THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE 403 (Roy S. Lee et al. eds., 2001).
48 Actually, provisions in the Statute and in the Rules permit the judges to admit
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As a general rule, the selection is discretionary, with only one
party being able to decide what is necessary to win its case and
what is not. 9 One very important exception to this rule is for the
prosecutor.so He or she must disclose to the defendant at the first
possible moment any exculpatory evidence, defined in broad terms
as "evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or control which he or
she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused,
or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the
credibility of prosecution evidence."" However, this exception
does not alter the structure of the system, which remains party-
based.52 Disclosure is completely in the hands of the litigants,
even though one of them must comply with the duty to inform the
counterparts of the existence of exculpatory materials.53
Notwithstanding a party-based shape, the sanctions system is
far more proximate to a policies-implementation model than a
litigation-solving model.54 As such, the system of sanctions in the
field of disclosure remains proactive-the State tends to reach its
ends irrespective of the parties behavior rather than remain
passive, leaving the burden on the parties to make a proper use of
the procedural machine." First, it is expressly provided in the ICC
statute that failure by the parties to comply with such detailed
provisions will not limit their right to present evidence.56 in a
reactive system, it would be exactly the opposite. Secondly, in the
first famous case that dealt with the ICC, the judges, though
finding that the prosecution disregarded its duty to disclose
proprio motu new evidence, though in a complementary way, as it was confirmed in the
decision Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga et Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/07, Directions for the Conduct of the Proceedings and Testimony In
Accordance with Rule 140 (November 20, 2009). These provisions do not, however,
alter the fact that disclosure is primarily, if not exclusively a burden of the parties.
49 See Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International
Criminal Court, supra note 37; Schabas, 'Complementarity in Practice': Some
Uncomplimentary Thoughts, supra note 37, at 5-33.
50 See Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 67.
5I Id.
52 See Arsajani and Reisman, supra note 37.
53 See id
54 See id
SS See id.
56 See generally Rome Statute, supra note 34.
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exculpatory evidence to the defense, opted for a simple
adjournment of the proceeding (a stay), and not for the
inadmissibility of the undisclosed evidence or for the dismissal of
the charges due to the abuse of process.5 7 In other words, the
judges took responsibility over the process, intervening to redress
a development that otherwise would have been unfair." In so
doing, however, they clearly showed a preference for a policies
implementation approach to the proceeding, rather than a
litigation-solving approach, despite the Statute and the Rules
provisions, all providing for a parties-based activity when dealing
with disclosure.59
V. Admission of Evidence: The Large Use of Ex Parte
Statements Collected Before Trial
As we have seen, the ICC provisions depict a party-led process
in the pre-trial phase."o This polarized structure is affirmed, with
some exceptions, at trial. Rule 140, notwithstanding its ambiguity,
confirms that the burden to introduce information and prove facts
relies mainly on the litigants, giving the judge some subsidiary
powers." The accusatorial structure of the trial was confirmed by
one of the first decisions issued by Trial Chamber II, in the
Katanga and Ngudjiolo Chui Case.6 2 In issuing directions for the
way in which the trial was conducted, the ICC judges shaped the
process in a manner very similar to that provided for by Rule 85 of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(hereinafter ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (hereinafter ICTR), with slight amendments due to the
57 See Caianiello, supra note 10, at 26-3 1.
58 See id.
59 See id. at 38.
60 See Kress, supra note 37.
61 See supra note 36.
62 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga et Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, supra note 48. It is
worth mentioning that the accusatorial structure is confirmed even in Le Procureur v.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-1/06, Requite aux fins de d6termination
des principes applicables aux questions pos6es aux t6moins par les juges, § 2 (January
25, 2010) in which it is pointed out that: "il n'appartient pas A la Cour d'analyser,
d'interroger les timoins par le ddtail sur des questions qui pourraient etre fort
litigieuses dans ce proces" (meaning "it is not for this Court to examine, question
witnesses in detail on issues that could be very contentious in this trial.").
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attendance of the Victims' Legal Representatives at the trial.
Typical accusatorial rules of evidence were applied, such as the
division of cases for the prosecution and for the defense of the
trial, the subsidiary and complementary role of the judges, the
prohibition of the party conducting the examination-in-chief from
posing leading questions (which are, by contrast, allowed during
cross-examination), and so on.63 Subsequent decisions make the
framework less clear and more uncertain.' Yet, as a general
consideration, it is possible to postulate that the statutory
provisions are more similar to an accusatorial structure than to an
inquisitorial one at trial.
However, a number of relevant provisions allow for the
admissibility of written statements at trial, even when gathered ex
parte during the investigations. For example, Article 69 of ICC
Statute permits the use of "recorded testimony," "documents," and
''written transcripts," as long as the evidence is not "prejudicial to
or inconsistent with the rights of the accused." Moreover, Rule 68
63 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/06,
Decision on judicial questioning (Mar. 18, 2010). During the examination of one
witness, the defense argued against "introducing into the proceedings criminal acts or
charges which do not fall within the scope of the charges confirmed against the
accused," and in this context it observed that "a significant portion of the questions put
by the Bench have related to the commission of acts of sexual violence, whilst no charge
of this nature was confirmed against the accused and, indeed, earlier in their evidence
some witnesses had not referred to this subject." The Trial Chamber I denied the
motion, affirming that:
The Rome Statute framework, and national judicial systems generally, do not
limit the role or the independence of the judges in the way suggested, and it is
for the judges to decide whether, when they intervene, it is appropriate to use
leading questions, depending on all the circumstances. For instance, the Bench
may conclude that earlier answers given by the person testifying, or other
witnesses, justify a judge dealing with an issue by way of leading rather than
neutral questioning.
Id. See also Lee Procureur v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/06, Decision on the defense observations regarding the right of the legal
representatives of victims to question defense witnesses and on the notion of personal
interest; Decision on the defense application to exclude certain representatives of victims
from the Chamber during the non-public evidence of various defense witnesses (Mar. 11,
2010) (concluding that presence of the victim's legal representative was important to
protect the victim's interest fully).
64 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga et Matheu Ngudjolo Chui, Transcript No. ICC-
01/04-01/07-T-83-Red-ENG WT 26-11-2009 1/68 NB T (Nov. 26, 2009) at 62; ICC-
01/04-01/07-T-86-Red-ENG WT 27-11-2009 1/31 NB T (Nov. 27, 2009) at 12.
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provides:
[T]he Trial Chamber may, in accordance with article 69,
paragraph 2, allow the introduction of previously recorded audio
or video testimony of a witness, or the transcript or other
documented evidence of such testimony, provided that:
(a) If the witness who gave the previously recorded
testimony is not present before the Trial Chamber, both the
Prosecutor and the defense had the opportunity to examine
the witness during the recording; or
(b) If the witness who gave the previously recorded
testimony is present before the Trial Chamber, he or she
does not object to the submission of the previously recorded
testimony and the Prosecutor, the defense and the Chamber
have the opportunity to examine the witness during the
proceedings.
In addition, the tradition at the international level is less
favorable to providing for strict rules on the admissibility of
evidence, instead relying on the principle of the free assessment of
information (so that parties unfamiliar with the international
procedural system can easily present their cases without being
limited by the technicalities typical of national models). 6
Most likely, the jurisprudence of the European Court on
Human Rights on the right of the defendant to examine or have
examined witnesses will be reproduced at the ICC level. What
matters is that the defendant has an opportunity to challenge the
witness, and that the judgment does not rely exclusively or
decisively on written unchallenged statements. The first decision
on the point confirms the judge's bias in favor of hearsay
evidence.6 7 On the basis of the previous considerations, we can
65 See Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 68.
66 ANNE-MARIE LA ROSA, JURISDICTIONS PENALES INTERNATIONALEs. LA
PROCEDURE ET LA PREUVE 253-55 (Presses Universitaires de France: Paris) (2003).
67 See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Prosecution's
Consolidated Response to Defense Objections to Admissibility in Principal and in
Substance, ICC-01/04-01/07-1558 and Requete de la Defense en vue d'obtenir une
decision d'irrecevabilit des documents lids aux timoins dicidds refirencs sous les
numdros T-167 et T-258, ICC-01/04-01/07-1556, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 (Nov. 16,
2009).
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argue that the system gives rise to some inconsistencies. On the
one hand, it is shaped as a dispute between the parties; on the other
hand, it does not strictly prohibit written ex parte statements (on
the contrary, it largely allows for them). The predictable
consequence of this inconsistency is that the outcome of the trial
will be strongly influenced by the elements collected during the
investigations, and that the prosecutor will play a predominant role
in the dispute because, structurally, the prosecutor is the party with
more resources in the pre-trial phase.
VI. Origins and Justification at the Basis of the Favor for
Written Evidence in Place of the Oral One
The frequent admissibility of unchallenged statements in
international criminal proceedings dates back, in recent times, to
the beginning of the new century. At the end of the 1990s, in fact,
the UN Secretary General appointed an expert group with the task
of examining which amendments could have been adopted to
improve the efficiency of the Ad Hoc Tribunals-the ICTY and
ICTR-in the administration of the cases pending before them.
The expert group presented a report, observing, inter alia, that the
use of written evidence in lieu of oral evidence would have been
helpful at this aim. Since then, the Ad Hoc Tribunals repeatedly
adopted a series of amendments to shift the fact-finding from oral
evidence to a system based on the written testimony (or, rectius, in
which oral and written evidence have roughly the same value, and
are admissible under the same conditions).68 The ICC has been
developing its case law on the point with a similar approach,
implementing and furthering the lesson learned from the Ad Hoc
Tribunals.6 9
In support of the shift from the oral to the written method, it
68 See supra note 11. See also Gideon Boas, Developments in the Law of
Procedure and Evidence at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court, 12 CRIM. LAW FORUM 169, 171
(2001); Gideon Boas, Creating Laws of Evidence for the International Criminal Law:
the ICTY and the Principle ofFlexibility, 12 CRIM. LAW FORUM 42, 45 (2001); Patrick L.
Robinson, Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 11 EUROPEAN J. INT. LAW 569, 576 (2000); Langer, supra
note 5, at 886-94. See also Megan A. Fairlie, Due Process Erosion: The Diminution of
Live Testimony at the ICTY, 34 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 47, 60-64 (2003).
69 See Illuminati, supra note 8, at 313.
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was argued that the lack of a jury would have rendered it
unnecessary to provide for a rule against hearsay. In jiry systems,
the hearsay rule is intended, in part, to prevent jurors from
overestimating evidence with little probative value but high
emotional impact. With cases tried before professional judges, the
risks of overestimation are greatly reduced, if not completely
absent. Besides, professional judges must justify their decisions
while jurors must not. The written justifications permit us to
detect mistakes related to erroneous evaluation of evidence not
challenged at trial. These observations seem to be shared by the
majority of studies advocating the shift to written evidence.70
Frankly, the observations of the study are not convincing. In
particular, it appears disputable that professional judges are able,
because of their training, to assess unchallenged statements. It is
far from clear the scientific basis on which the reasoning rests. If
we look at the issue in an historical perspective, it becomes
apparent that the opposite has been true in different times and
places: professional judges do not have any special skills to detect
unconvincing, unchallenged testimonial statements.
For example, in the nineteenth century, a prominent scholar
and judge at the French Cour de Cassation, Faustin H61ie,
commenting on the biases inherent in adjudication, wrote:
However, who does not know the almost despotic power of
our minds? Who does not know that we do more easily and
with inertia what we do every day, and how habit weakens
ardor and resistance? Our conscience carelessly dozes off
in the day-to-day fight, and the continuous repetition of the
same acts makes weaker its control. Time after time, the
judge, who has heard so many false protests, so many false
pleas of innocence, so many culprits who refused to face
the facts, so many shameless and perverse persons, allows
a sort of presumption that the accused is immoral and
guilty to penetrate his heart. He cannot see but through
this shadow. And, because of his integrity, he is indignant
at the wickedness that is constantly before his eyes. Thus,
70 MAY & WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, supra note 70, at 117-
119. See also VLADIMIR TOCHILOVSKY, JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE 399-402 (2008). The fact that judges are professional is outlined in Kai
Ambos, supra note 3, at 2-4. See also Fairlie, supra note 5, at 281-82.
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he is led to mix up one accused with another, and then to
punish all with heavier sentences, having this sole remedy
in his hands. It is not that the judge comes to consider
every accused person guilty, but rather that he comes to
prematurely suspect the accused of being guilty. In this
state of mind, the most grave facts charged take on the
value of clues, and the clues take on the value of clear
evidence.7'
For these reasons, H61ie concluded that non-professional jurors
would have been better prepared to weigh prudently the evidence
in a criminal process, whereas professional judges would have
been subject to the risk of bias caused by previous experiences
(such as the presumption of the defendant's guilt).
Analogous considerations were cited by Patricia M. Wald,
judge at the ICTY, when that tribunal was shifting from oral to
written evidence. Ms. Wald observed:
Donning a robe does not enshroud its occupant with a
seventh sense of whether something written on paper is
true or false. In that sense, the judge is on a par with the
juror, who must rely on his or her human instinct in
evaluating the person doing the testifying. To permit
critical material to be admitted without the ability to
directly view and question the witness goes to the heart of
the process and threatens to squander the ICTY's most
precious asset-its reputation for fairness and truth
seeking.72
The argument that a professional judge is more likely to
presume the guilt than the innocence of the defendant because of
professional experience was expressed with undoubted humor by
another famous American scholar, Alan M. Dershowitz, in "Rules
of Justice," who again pointed out the risks of judge's professional
judgment being clouded by bias.73
71 FAUSTIN HtLIE, TEORICA DEL CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE 54-64 (Luigi
Sampolo) (1880) (translated by the author).
72 Patricia. M. Wald, ICTY Judicial Proceedings: An Appraisal from Within, 2 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 471, 473 (2004).
73 As is well known, the following would be the "rules of justice," according to Mr.
Dershowitz:
Almost all criminal defendants are, in fact, guilty. II. All criminal defense
lawyers, prosecutors and judges understand and believe Rule I. III. It is easier to
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It is also interesting to observe that while some scholars
maintain that professional judges at the international criminal level
do not need complicated rules on evidence admissibility, others
maintain just the opposite, especially in regard to issues other than
the preference for live testimony over written testimony. One
such instance is that of witness proofing. Dealing with the first
case on witness proofing, the Pre-Trial Chamber I of ICC decided
that witness proofing by the parties should have been declared
inadmissible."4 This decision gave rise to an ample debate,7 5 with
some scholars supporting the opinion of the ICC judges while
some others contested it. Among the former, Kai Ambos,
defending the Pre-Trial Chamber's conclusions, observed that the
convict guilty defendants by violating the Constitution than by complying with
it, and in some cases it is impossible to convict guilty defendants without
violating the Constitution. IV. Almost all police lie about whether they violated
the Constitution in order to convict guilty defendants. V. All prosecutors, judges
and defense attorneys are aware of Rule IV. VI. Many prosecutors implicitly
encourage police to lie about whether they violated the Constitution in order to
convict guilty defendants. VII. All judges are aware of Rule VI. VIII. Most trial
judges pretend to believe police officers who they know are lying. XIX. All
appellate judges are aware of Rule VIII, yet many pretend to believe the trial
judges who pretend to believe the lying police officers. X. Most judges
disbelieve defendants about whether their constitutional rights have been
violated, even if they are telling the truth. XI. Most judges and prosecutors
would not knowingly convict a defendant who they believe to be innocent of the
crime charges (or closely related crime). XII. Rule XI does not apply to
members of organized crime, drug dealers, career criminals, or potential
informers. XIII. Nobody really wants justice.
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE, xxi-xxii (1989).
74 Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Practices of Witness
Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, ICC-01/04-01/06-679, PTC I (Nov. 8, 2006). An
analogous procedural solution was adopted one year later by Trial Chamber (TC) I
concerning lay witnesses for the purposes of trial proceedings. Prosecutor v. Lubanga
Dyilo, Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses for
Giving Testimony at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, T. Ch.1 (Nov. 30, 2007). In contrast
to lay witnesses, expert witnesses may be instructed by the parties jointly or separately.
See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Procedures to be Adopted for
Instructing Expert Witnesses, ICC-O1/ 04-01/06-1069, T. Ch. I, (Dec. 10, 2007).
75 See Sergey Vasiliev, Proofing The Ban on 'Witness Proofing': Did the ICC Get
It Right?, 20 CRIM. L. F. 193, 193-261 (2009); Kai Ambos, 'Witness Proofing' before the
International Criminal Court: A Reply to Karemaker, Taylor, and Pittman, 21 LEIDEN J.
OF INT'L. L. 910, 911-916 (2008); Ruben Karemaker, B. Don Taylor III, & Thomas
Wayde Pittman, Witness Proofing in International Criminal Tribunals: Response to
Ambos, 21 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L. L. 917, 917-23 (2008).
306
LAW OF EvIDENCE AT THE ICC
international judges would have lacked the necessary skills to
detect the interferences of the counsels due to witness proofing in
the evaluation of the witness testimony at trial. Ambos observed
that:
The superiority of professional judges over lay jurors
(section 5.3.2) as to the verification of the authenticity of a
witness statement-that is, a question of fact-is also
highly doubtful. In fact, the involvement of lay persons in
the criminal justice process, be it as jurors or as members
of a mixed bench, rests on the belief that these persons are,
due to their professional or social background, often in a
better position to judge the veracity of a witness statement.
In addition, the superiority argument rests on the false
assumption that the judges of international criminal
tribunals are all professional judges. The sad reality is,
however, that too many judges have no judicial
background at all and only pass the eligibility test (Art.
36(3)(b) ICC Statute) because of an all-too-generous
interpretation of the requirement of 'competence in
relevant areas of international law.' 76
The last quotation on the proofing issue shows how
disputable-if not wrong-the assumption that professional judges
have a superior ability to make prudential assessments of the
evidence produced in writt-en form can be. If it is debatable that
professional judges have sufficient preparation to detect the
improper interferences on live witness testimony due to proofing,
the assumption that they are prepared enough to assess properly
unchallenged statements formed in the pre-trial phase is even more
questionable. Actually, it should be far less difficult to weigh the
spontaneity and genuineness of the witness when the witness is
present at trial and is subject to cross-examination than to evaluate
the reliability of an unchallenged testimonial written statement.
The witness's attendance allows the verification of his or her
credibility, and in some cases even the admission that he or she
was influenced in some way by the proofing activity. However,
when written statements are at stake, there is no means by which it
is possible to test the reliability of the source. In a nutshell, if
76 Ambos, supra note 3, at 5 (citing Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 36(3)(b)(ii))
(citations omitted).
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judges are not sufficiently trained to assess witness credibility in
the case of proofing, they should be considered far less prepared to
handle written, unchallenged statements collected out of court.
VII. Inconsistencies and Their Consequences
The considerations discussed above show that the ICC
procedural system is flawed by inconsistencies, and these
inconsistencies can be detected using traditional theoretical
models.
Looking at the disclosure phase, it is evident that the defense is
systematically disadvantaged. On the one hand, in the
presentation phase the defense is subject to the prosecutor's
choices and has few powers to challenge them. On the other hand,
the misconduct of the prosecutor appears far from being
effectively sanctioned because judges prefer to use procedural
sanctions to keep the case on track, rather than closing it because
of prosecutorial negligence. If we consider the admission of
evidence phase, notwithstanding a general accusatorial framework,
the rules governing admissibility resemble the inquisitorial model
more." The Chambers have interpreted the Statute and the Rules
to give the judge the greatest discretion concerning which items of
evidence can be admitted at trial, leaving no room for technical
formalities in this area. This solution risks undermining the
equality of arms between the prosecution and the defense. As
noted previously, the prosecutor is advantaged by the admissibility
of information collected during the investigations phase because of
77 D.K. Piragoff, Evidence, in THE INT'L CRIM. CT-ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 349, 351 (R. S. Lee ed., Transnational Publishers
2001) ("The compromise in the Rome Statute was to eschew generally the technical
formalities of the common law system of admissibility of evidence in favour of the
flexibility of the civil law system, provided that the Court has a discretion to 'rule on the
relevance or admissibility of any evidence."') (emphasis added). For a similar but more
critical approach, see Fairlie, supra note 5, at 291. Fairlie observes:
[T]he essential absence of rules governing admissibility of evidence generally
results in a loss of protection for the accused. In light of the foregoing, it is
certainly possible that the 'largely adversarial approach' of the Tribunal could
itself give new life to the perception that the adversarial system provides 'only a
veneer of fairness'. The argument advanced is not, however, that the Tribunal
suffers from an adversarial deficit; rather, it is that there exists a danger of a
due-process deficit.
Id.
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the far broader means at his disposal. Therefore, the framework
emerging from this analysis shows that trial provisions are not
completely shaped to redress the advantages gained by the
prosecutor during the pre-trial phase. In other words, the
defense's relatively weaker position (with respect to the
prosecutor) remains unbalanced at trial, despite the fact that
Article 67, paragraph 1(e) of the ICC Statute concerning the
admission of evidence establishes the defense's entitlement to
enjoy the same conditions as the prosecution.
VIII. Possible remedies
A. Neo-Inquisitorial Reform of the System?
To remedy the inconsistencies outlined above, two options
appear possible. The first and most direct option, drawn from the
conclusions discussed previously, is to move the system toward a
more continental, inquisitorial model. The exceptions to the
accusatorial structure are at the same time too broad and too
specific to be compatible with the actual general structure of the
proceeding. It is better, therefore, to renounce any accusatorial
ambitions and rebuild the system in an inquisitorial way. "
Consequently, it could be suitable to gather the evidence in the
hands of a sort of judge of instructions (juge d'instruction); at the
ICC, this would imply giving the necessary powers to the Pre-
Trial Chamber to operate as a "juge d'instruction." Moreover, it
should be feasible to provide for an official file of the proceeding,
accessible by the parties after the end of the investigations (and, at
any rate, in due time before trial). At trial, the principle of free
admission and evaluation of evidence should rule. The judges
should play a proactive role in trying the case, provided that the
prosecutor and the defendant have the same possibilities to present
further evidence and that the conviction is not based exclusively
(or in a decisive manner) on evidence never subject to cross-
examination. In other words, except for this specific safeguard-
that the defendant had an effective occasion to challenge witnesses
when the evidence is decisive-no rule against hearsay should be
78 For a provocative, perhaps drastic position on the issue, see William T. Pizzi,
Overcoming Logistical and Structural Barriers to Fair Trials at International Tribunals,
I INTERNATIONAL COMMENTARY ON EVIDENCE 4, 1, 3 (2006).
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provided for.
Notwithstanding its consistency and lack of ambiguity, the
neo-inquisitorial reform of the ICC appears far from being
implemented at the moment. First of all, it would be necessary to
amend the Statute, a very complicated task.7 9 To modify the
Statute, Article 127 provides that two-thirds of States Parties
(acting at an assembly of states parties or at a review conference)
may "adopt" amendments."0 In order to come into force, the
amendments need to be accepted by individual State Parties."' For
all the amendments not concerning the definition of the crimes (or
the introduction of a new crime), paragraph 4 provides that they
will be effective for all State Parties once they have been accepted
by seven-eighths of the State Parties, which is an extremely high
threshold.8 2 Accordingly, since the Rome Statute currently counts
111 State Parties, an amendment would have to be ratified by 74
of them. Moreover, paragraph 6 provides a State that does not
accept an amendment the right to withdraw from the Statute with
immediate effect. 83 In light of the aforementioned hurdles to
79 To understand the relevant provisions for amending the Rome Statute, see Rome
Statute, supra note 34, art. 121, §§ 3-6:
3. The adoption of an amendment at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties
or at a Review Conference on which consensus cannot be reached shall require
a two-thirds majority of States Parties. 4. Except as provided in paragraph 5, an
amendment shall enter into force for all States Parties one year after instruments
of ratification or acceptance have been deposited with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations by seven-eighths of them. 5. Any amendment to articles 5,
6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those States Parties which
have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of
ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the
amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime
covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party's nationals or
on its territory. 6. If an amendment has been accepted by seven-eighths of
States Parties in accordance with paragraph 4, any State Party which has not
accepted the amendment may withdraw from this Statute with immediate effect,
notwithstanding article 127, paragraph 1, but subject to article 127, paragraph 2,
by giving notice no later than one year after the entry into force of such
amendment.
Id. See also, Schabas, supra note 39, at 678-82.
80 See Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 127.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 127, 1 6.
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amendment, the aim of modifying the Statute in order to resolve
the inconsistencies in the procedural system does not seem very
realistic. Finally, it must be taken into account that the first
Review Conference on the Rome Statute held in Kampala, Uganda
th
ended on June 11 , 2010, and during the review conference the
delegates did not take any action concerning amendments of
procedural provisions."
B. A More Realistic Approach: Some Changes in the
Interpretation of the Existing Sources
1. Disclosure
All of the above considerations lead to the conclusion that the
structure of the proceedings will remain in its prevailingly
accusatorial form for the long run. For the sake of rendering the
84 The Kampala Conference represented the first opportunity to consider
amendments to the Rome Statute from its entry into force in 2002, and to take stock of
its implementation and impact. The most important result achieved in Kampala has been
the amendment of the Statute as to include the definition of the crime of aggression,
which will be Article 8 of the Statute. According to Article 8:
"For the purpose of this Statute, 'crime of aggression' means the planning,
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an
act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations."
Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 8. For a complete version of the Resolution adopted by
the ICC, see Resolution RC/Res.6, The Crime of Aggression, ICC Resolution (June 11,
2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf. In
addition to the resolution on the crime of aggression, the Conference:
... also adopted a resolution by which it amended article 8 of the Rome Statute
to bring under the jurisdiction of the Court the war crime of employing certain
poisonous weapons and expanding bullets, asphyxiating or poisonous gases, and
all analogous liquids, materials and devices, when committed in armed conflicts
not of an international character. Furthermore, the Conference adopted a
resolution by which it decided to retain article 124 in its current form and
agreed to again review its provisions during the fourteenth session of the
Assembly of States Parties, in 2015. Article 124 allows new States Parties to
opt for excluding from the Court's jurisdiction war crimes allegedly committed
by its nationals or on its territory for a period of seven years.
Press Release, ICC, Review Conference of the Rome Statute concludes in Kampala, ICC
Press Release ICC-ASP-20100612-PR546 (June 12, 2010). For more on the Kampala
Conference, see Robert L. Manson, Identifying the Rough Edges of the Kampala
Compromise, 21 CRIM. L. F. 417 (2010).
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system less inconsistent, it is suitable to intervene at the
interpretative level, taking into account the general accusatorial
nature of the mechanisms.ss
Some possible interpretative changes could concern the
disclosure phase. The first interpretive change should concern the
standard to be met by the defense when applying for additional
disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence. The defense
should not be required to meet too severe of a standard to obtain
access to further information. The second interpretive change
should concern sanctions. The failure to disclose evidence in due
time, which is required at trial by any party, should lead to the
inadmissibility of that evidence. In other words, the judges should
refrain from intervening to remedy the parties' misbehavior
(except when the evidence at stake seems to have the potential for
playing a decisive role in the adjudication of the case).
Finally, if the prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence is repeated and blatant, it should lead to the dismissal of
the charges against the accused (and not to a mere postponement
of the trial). Although there is not any clear provision permitting
the adoption of such sanctions, there is not a prohibition by the
Statute or by the Rules, and these sanctions would be consistent,
for the considerations expressed above, with the party's litigation
structure for the trial.
At the present time, the ICC practice on disclosure seems to
have opted for a third way: to implement a managerial style in the
disclosure phase, giving the judges the power to influence the
activity of the parties.86 Judges seem to have an increasingly
85 But cf Alphons Orie, Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial Approach in International
Criminal Proceedings, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 1439-1495, (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R.W.D. Jones) (2002)
(acknowledging that "[i]n the ICC, the position of the essential parties, prosecution and
defense, at the trial is still very much common-law oriented."). Orie also observed that
"[a]part from the fundamental aspects, practice has shown (especially in the United
States and ICTY) that the characteristic elements of the adversarial model tend to
paralyse the administration of justice in serious and complex cases." Id. at 1442. This
sounds like an implicit suggestion to the interpreter to apply the system with an
inquisitorial hermeneutic approach, rather than remaining faithful with the lines
indicated by the legislature.
86 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07, Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the "Order concerning
the Presentation of Incriminating Evidence and the E-Court Protocol," (Mar. 23, 2009),
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active approach in the disclosure phase. " This option can
undoubtedly be helpful for the defense who may take advantage
when the prosecutor does not completely fulfill his disclosure
duties. " The defendant may reasonably rely on judicial
intervention to redress the lack of communication exchange
between the prosecutor and defense due to prosecutorial inertia. 9
However, judges remain reluctant to sanction severely in cases of
prosecutorial negligence during disclosure.90 This aspect should
be at least slightly redressed. The proactive judicial approach
risks being inefficient, 91 considering that the collection of
information is in the hands of the prosecutor during the
investigation phase; only the prosecutor knows the entirety of the
evidence gathered by his office before trial. 92 Judges cannot
search in the prosecutors' files to gather more information relevant
to a case. 93 For this reason, a more rigid interpretation in the field
of procedural sanction appears desirable when disclosure
provisions are found to have been violated.9 4
2. Admission ofEvidence
As far as the admission of evidence is concerned, a possible
solution to the disparity between the prosecution and defense,
especially when faced with the dilemma of written versus oral
evidence, could be to develop and improve the line of
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc648874.pdf. The Prosecutor asked
for leave to appeal the decision of the Trial Chamber dated March 13, 2009, with which
the trial chamber ordered the Prosecutor "to prepare a detailed and comprehensive
analytical chart of all the incriminatory evidence it intends to offer at trial and to provide
that chart to the Court and the Defence at least several months in advance of the trial,"
notwithstanding they recognized that "the Prosecution ... remains master of its case and
has full control over the selection and presentation of evidence in the Table." Id.
87 See, e.g., id at 1.
88 See MAY, supra note 70, at 84.
89 See id.
90 See id (explaining that courts generally have not imposed harsh sanctions where,
typically, no prejudice can be shown as against the defense).
91 Cf id. at 278-79 (stressing the importance of an expeditious trial).
92 Cf Panzavolta, supra note 21, at 403.
93 See id. at 425.
94 See discussion supra Part II (detailing the considerations expressed regarding the
disproportion of means between the prosecutor and the defense).
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interpretation of the acts and conduct of the accused adopted at the
ICTR and ICTY level. It is noteworthy that ICTR Rule 929s and
ICTY Rule 92 96 both dichotomize the approach to evidence
concerning the acts and conduct of the accused and evidence
pertaining to contextual features.97 To prove the former, counsel
should utilize oral evidence" through examination and cross-
examination, as outlined in Rule 85 of the ICTR 99 and ICTY.'0o
Conversely, to prove the latter, documents and statements
collected out of court (even if untested) are admissible, or
implicitly preferable.'o' Furthermore, in ICTR and ICTY best case
law, it is well established that when evidence is crucial for the
defendant, even if it does not directly refer to the acts and conduct
of the accused, live testimony must be given preference over
written testimony.'02 This way, the accused's right to examine or
cross-examine witnesses provided for in the Ad Hoc Tribunals
Statutes is respected in the most practicable way possible.'o3 If
95 Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia [ICTY RPE] Rule 92 at 12.
96 Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda [ICTR RPE] Rule 92bis.
97 See ICTY RPE, Rule 92bis (A)(i) at 2. The Rule provides:
Factors in favour of admitting evidence in the form of a written statement
include but are not limited to circumstances in which the evidence in question:
(a) is of a cumulative nature, in that other witnesses will give or have given oral
testimony of similar facts; (b) relates to relevant historical, political or military
background; (c) consists of a general or statistical analysis of the ethnic
composition of the population in the places to which the indictment relates; (d)
concerns the impact of crimes upon victims; (e) relates to issues of the character
of the accused; or (f) relates to factors to be taken into account in determining
sentence;
Id. See also supra notes 11, 29.
98 See MAY AND WrERDA, supra note 70, at 143,165, and 343-44.
99 See ICTR RPE, Rule 85.
100 Id.
101 See May, International Criminal Evidence, supra note 70, at 344.
102 See Robinson, supra note 68, at 578-80.
103 See id (discussing tribunal cases). See also Gordon, supra note 1, at 42-44; MAY
AND WIERDA, supra note 70, at 229-31 (discussing tribunal cases). It can be observed
that the preference for hearing the witness live at trial because of crucial evidence, even
if falling under the cases in which formally written statements could be admitted, is still
prevalent at the ICTY despite the introduction of Rules 92 ter and 92 quater. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, et al., IT-05-87-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for
314
LAW OF EVIDENCE AT THE ICC
applied scrupulously, the line of interpretation based on the
"crucial evidence" doctrine could produce a satisfactory blend of
the various exigencies that any international criminal trial must
fulfill. 104 One would also have to refrain from the constant
temptation to consider items of evidence as non-crucial merely
because they do not directly affect the acts and conduct of the
accused.1 o5  This occurs occasionally at the Ad Hoc Tribunals.'06
For example, witnesses who make statements concerning the acts
and conduct of co-perpetrators should always be cross-examined,
and out of court statements could be admitted, at most, in lieu of
the examination-in-chief.107 Testimonial statements regarding co-
perpetrators, far from concerning merely contextual features, are,
indeed, crucial in terms of capacity to influence the judges.
It is true that at the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the evidentiary system is
shifting progressively and, perhaps worryingly, toward the
admissibility of any type of written evidence.'s For example,
Rule 92-quinquies provides for broader exceptions to the orality
principle.'09 However, these latest changes, obtained in part by
Admission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 at 13 (Feb. 16, 2007); Prosecutor v. D.
Milogevid, IT-98-29/1-T, Decision on Admission of Written Statements, Transcripts and
Associated Exhibits Pursuant to Rule 92 at 3,4 (Feb. 22, 2007).
104 Cf MAY, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, supra note 70, at 348.
105 Cf id. at 345.
106 Cf id at 227 (providing that some courts exclude some evidence that does not
address the acts and conduct of the accused).
107 See Mark Wasef, Procedural Rules in International Litigation: Admissibility of
Transcript ofInterview ofAccused Against Co-accused, 20 CRIM. L.F. 447 (2009).
108 See, e.g., ICTY RPE Rule 92ter and Rule 92quater (codifying the admissibility
of a wide range of written evidence).
109 See id. The rule provides in total:
(A) A Trial Chamber may admit the evidence of a person in the form of a
written statement or a transcript of evidence given by the person in proceedings
before the Tribunal, where the Trial Chamber is satisfied that:
(i) the person has failed to attend as a witness or, having attended, has not
given evidence at all or in a material respect;
(ii) the failure of the person to attend or to give evidence has been
materially influenced by improper interference, including threats,
intimidation, injury, bribery, or coercion;
(iii) where appropriate, reasonable efforts have been made pursuant to
Rules 54 and 75 to secure the attendance of the person as a witness or, if in
attendance, to secure from the witness all material facts known to the
witness; and
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amending the Rules"o and in part by abandoning the previous case
law regarding crucial evidence, are due to both the completion
strategy imposed by the U.N. Security Council on the Ad Hoc
Tribunals11 and the practical need to speed up the work of the
Tribunals.1 12 In other words, the previous sources were amended
for expediency and not because they were considered unfair.
These time concerns should not influence the ICC, which has not
provided for any completion strategy. " This is why the
implementation at the ICC level of the jurisprudence originally
developed through Rule 92-bis of the ICTY and ICTR seems
plausible. Indeed, it seems an efficient way to balance the right of
(iv) the interests of justice are best served by doing so.
(B) For the purposes of paragraph (A):
(i) An improper interference may relate inter alia to the physical,
economic, property, or other interests of the person or of another person;
(ii) the interests of justice include:
(a) the reliability of the statement or transcript, having regard to the
circumstances in which it was made and recorded;
(b) the apparent role of a party or someone acting on behalf of a party to the
proceedings in the improper interference; and
(c) whether the statement or transcript goes to proof of the acts and conduct
of the accused as charged in the indictment. (iii) Evidence admitted under
paragraph (A) may include evidence that goes to proof of the acts and
conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment.
(C) The Trial Chamber may have regard to any relevant evidence, including
written evidence, for the purpose of applying this Rule.
Id
110 See id.
111 See S.C. Reg. 1534, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004).
112 See id Recent scholarship has focused on these critical considerations involving
issues related to evidence, among others. See Dominic Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and
its Completion Strategy. Efforts to Achieve Accountability for War Crimes and their
Tribunals, 3 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 82, 97 (2005); Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial Effects of
the "Completion Strategies" on the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 99 Am. J.
Int'l L. 142, 142-43 (2005); Larry D. Johnson, Closing an International Criminal
Tribunal while Maintaining International Human Rights Standards and Excluding
Impunity, 99 Am. J. Int'l L. 158, 159-61 (2005); Lorenzo Gradoni, You Will Receive a
Fair Trial Elsewhere: The ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals Acting as Human
Rights Jurisdictions, 54 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 1, 2-4 (2007).
113 See Kevin Jon Heller, Completion Strategies 1 (Leuven Centre for Global
Governance Studies, Working Paper, 2009), available at
http://www.ipp.ghum.kuleuven.be/publications/heller.pdf.
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confrontation with the need to conduct the trial within a reasonable
time.1 14
IX. Conclusion
ICC rules of evidence depict a mixed system which is,
unsurprisingly, neither wholly inquisitorial nor wholly
accusatorial. Among the numerous provisions, some
inconsistencies seem to emerge, most noticeably in both the
disclosure and admission of evidence phases. Consequently, a
discrepancy becomes apparent between the general structure of the
system-seemingly reliant on the parties' initiative-and the
provisions concerning procedural sanctions and prohibitions-
reliant on judicial initiative.
It is time to intervene at the interpretative level to redress the
114 It must be added that, in spite of the necessity to close cases because of the
completion strategy, this line of protection for the accused's rights has been maintained
in many cases throughout the existence of the tribunal. See, e.g. Prosecutor v. Karazdid,
Case No. IT-95-5/19-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Testimony of
Witness KDZ198 and Associated Exhibits Pursuant to Rule 92, 14 (Aug 20, 2009)
(addressing facts committed by subordinates, when the accused is a military commander
or superior); Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, et al., Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on
Prosecution's Rule 92 Motion, 11 n.76 (July 4, 2006) (addressing fact regarding
statements concerning a participant in a joint criminal enterprise). In such cases, Trial
Chambers of ICTR and ICTY preferably opt for either the live testimony in lieu of a
written statement, or admission of the written statement in substitution of the
examination-in-chief only, thereby leaving the defense the right to cross-examine the
witness directly. See Prosecutor v. Dordevi6, IT-05-87/1-T, Decision on Prosecution's
Motion for Admission of Evidence of Witness Milan Dakovi6 Pursuant to Rule 92, 1 8-
9 (Aug 13, 2009); Karazdi6, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of
Testimony of Witness KDZ198 and Associated Exhibits Pursuant to Rule 92, 14
(admitting evidence requested by the Prosecutor after observing that the witness had
already been cross-examined previously, in a separate proceeding, by another defendant
in a position similar to Karazdid's); Milutinovi6, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on
Prosecution's Rule 92 Motion, 21-22; Prosecutor v. S. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-
AR73.4, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on the Admissibility of Evidence-in-Chief in
the Form of Written Statements, T 16 (Sep. 30, 2003); Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T,
Decision on Prosecution Motion for the Admission of Transcripts in lieu of Viva Voce
Testimony Pursuant to 92(d) - Foca Transcripts, T 48 (June 30, 2003). But see
Prosecutor v. Gotovina, et al., Case No. IT-06-90-T, Decision on Defendant Ante
Gotovina's Motion for Admission of Evidence of one Witness Pursuant to Rule 92, 6-
7 (Sep. 16, 2009) (admitting written testimony from witness eliciting relevant "historical,
political, and military background").
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system in a manner more coherent with its accusatorial general
structure. Focusing on the admission of evidence, the adoption of
both the distinction between acts and conduct of the accused
versus contextual features and the "crucial evidence doctrine,"
could improve the equality of arms principle at trial if applied
rigorously at ICC level. Further, this could address the
disproportionate means existing between the Prosecution and
Defense in Pre-Trial phase.
By not adopting these suggested analytical solutions, the ICC
risks evolving into the worst among the hypotheticals previously
depicted: a system giving rise to a general accusatorial structure
with specific inquisitorial provisions during crucial passages of the
proceeding. If this is to be the final outcome, the defendant will
be systematically disadvantaged because of the structural
superiority of means provided to the Prosecutor, who may produce
as evidence any statements or item gathered during the
investigations."' As one Italian scholar once affirmed, the worst
thing, for the sake of fairness of process, is to bear the accusatorial
principles "in the mouth," while maintaining a strong preference
for the inquisitorial features "in the heart." "6
115 One could argue that the duty to act in an impartial way in the investigation
phase, provided by article 54 (1)(a) of the Rome Statute, provides for an effective mean
to protect the chances of the defendant to win at trial. See Rome Statute, supra note 34,
art. 54(l)(a). This observation is unconvincing. If remaining impartial represents an
almost impossible goal for the judge of instruction, as most scholars pointed out in Italy
before the accusatorial reform, afortiori this should be true for the Prosecutor, called to
take action at the end of the investigation and to present the prosecution case at trial:
inevitably he will always be biased by his role in the proceedings and by the choices the
law requires him to adopt.
116 The original phrase was pronounced during a Conference in 1964 by Pietro
Nuvolone, a famous scholar of criminal law. The complete quotation, translated by me
from Italian, sounds: "many ... of those who apparently talk about an 'accusatorial
process' have in practice the inquisition, the inquisitorial process in their heart" PIETRO
NUVOLONE, CRITERI DIRETTIVI PER UNA RIFORMA DEL PROCESSO PENALE 196 (Giuffr:
Milano, 1965). The metaphor was taken back in another famous scholar's article, see
Massimo Nobili, L'accusatorio sulle labbra, I'inquisitorio nel cuore, 4-5 CRITICA DEL
DIRITTO, at I1-17(1992).
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